



Seðlabanki Íslands

Spot the difference: Economic performance and currency regimes in the global financial crisis

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The views expressed are my own and do not have to reflect those of the Central Bank of Iceland or the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank

Introduction



- An exchange rate is both a relative price that can absorb idiosyncratic shocks and an asset price that often seems unrelated to fundamentals
 - This fact makes the question whether fixed or flexible exchange rates are more suitable all the more difficult
- Both regimes can work and economic performance ultimately depends on sound economic policy rather than the exchange rate regime chosen
- To argue this point, I want to take a few examples from the recent global financial crisis

Economic performance in the crisis

Two countries – two currency regimes



- Iceland has followed a flexible exchange rate regime with an inflation target since 2001
- Ireland has been a member of a monetary union since 1999
- Despite this, the trends in the real exchange rates up to the global financial crisis are strikingly similar
- But the post-crisis development is radically different

Real exchange rate developments in two different exchange rate regimes



Source: Bank of International Settlements.


Economic performance in the crisis

Two countries – two currency regimes



- Did this dramatic difference in post-crisis real exchange rates lead to large differences in post-crisis economic performance?
- Not really
 - Both countries troughed at a similar time
 - The contraction in Iceland was larger but the recovery from the trough somewhat stronger

GDP developments in two different exchange rate regimes




Economic performance in the crisis

Did CEE's performance depend on the currency regime?



- At first sight it seems that CEE countries with more flexible exchange rates did better ...
- ... but at closer inspection, this observation seems largely driven by Poland's performance
- Excluding Poland, it becomes hard to argue that one regime outperformed the other
 - The peak-to-trough contraction is close to 10% in most of the countries irrespective of what exchange rate regime they use

GDP loss and nominal exchange rate flexibility in 11 CEE countries during financial crisis¹



1. Change in nominal effective exchange rate real GDP between peak in 2005Q1-2008Q4 and trough following peak up to 2013Q1.


Economic performance in the crisis

Did export recovery depend on the currency regime?



- What about the post-crisis export performance?
- Again, no clear pattern emerges
 - 2 of the top 3 and bottom 3 performers are pegs
 - Of the top 10 performers, 5 are pegs and 5 flexible
 - Of the bottom 10 performers, 6 are pegs and 4 flexible
- Difference between average performance not statistically significant
- Other factors probably more important than the actual currency regime in place
 - E.g. export structure and markets

Exports of goods and services in 40 countries after the global financial crisis¹



1. Red bars indicate countries following a pegged exchange rate regime or within EMU. Blue bars indicate countries following a flexible exchange rate regime. Sources: Eurostat, OECD.

Economic performance in the crisis

Did the currency regime matter at all?



	GDP	Con- sumption	Unem- ployment
Peak/trough change (%)			
All	6.8	6.2	4.5
EMU	7.2	5.5	4.8
Non-EMU	6.5	6.5	4.3
Duration (quarters)			
All	5.3	5.7	6.5
EMU	6.3	6.7	7.2
Non-EMU	4.7*	5.2*	6.2

Country sample includes 46 medium- to high-income countries.
* indicates that the difference between sub-group averages is statistically significant at the 10% level based on Satterthwaite Welch *t*-test.

Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2012). Iceland's currency and exchange rate policy options. *Special Publication*, no. 7, Chapter 17.

- A systematic comparison does not suggest any clear difference between economic performance depending on currency regimes
- A recent study by myself and a colleague suggests that factors related to pre-crisis imbalances were the decisive factor in determining how badly the real economy got hit by the global financial crisis

Conclusions



- Exchange rates and exchange rate regimes matter of course
- In the end, however, economic performance depends more on other factors
- The key to favourable economic outcomes is sound macroeconomic stabilisation policy
- Some may find that pegging to another currency or joining a monetary union to be a helpful disciplinary device to achieve that
- Others may find this step to be too constraining and the cost in terms of lost instrument too high
- Both can be right